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DISCUSSION KICK-OFF
Brother, where art thou?
Libya, spaces of violence and the diffusion of knowledge
The key political question in recent months has been how to reduce the number of
unauthorized migrants that arrive to Europe’s shores in rickety vessels from politically
unstable countries in North Africa. The overwhelming majority of the more than 134.000
migrants that arrived by sea to Europe this year landed on Italian shores (approximately
103.300). Most of the migrants landing in Italy departed from wartorn Libya.
Italy seems to have found a solution for reducing these numbers. According to figures
released by the Italian Ministry of Interior, the numbers of migrants dropped from 23.524
(June 2017) to 5.600 (August 2017). Last year, Italy counted more than 25.000 arrivals per
month and in August 2015 more than 130.000.
This decrease in numbers is largely based on a Memorandum of Understanding, an
informal political agreement, between Italy and Libya that aims to “combat illegal
immigration” and “reinforcing the border security” between the two countries. Although
the agreement was already concluded in February 2017, it seems that technical and
financial support, as well as training of Libyan security personnel became effective only a
few months after its conclusion. Marco Minniti, Italy’s minister of interior, described the
decreasing number of arriving migrants as a political success and wants Europe to pay its
share. Indeed, the EU did pay its (limited) share. In February this year, EU member states
enhanced the Malta Declaration that envisages “training, equipment and support to the
Libyan national coast guard and other relevant agencies” and in April 90 million euros
were earmarked for Libya in the EU Trust Fund for Africa.
Of course, the decrease in numbers does not mean that the people stopped fleeing
persecution, violence, or poverty, but simply that they stopped arriving to Italian shores.
This raises the question: where are they?
Strategies of diffusion 
The answer on the whereabouts of unauthorized migrants presupposes knowing whom
the Italian government exactly finances. It seems paradoxical that despite widespread
media coverage, there is hardly any knowledge about which groups and factions are in
fact financially supported. The Memorandum of Understanding, concluded between the
National Reconciliation Government (NRG) in Libya and the Italian government, suggests
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that funds flow to the NRG. Yet, as control of Libyan territory is fractured between local
armed militias, ‘city-states’, two rival governments, and Islamic fundamentalists, limiting
the dispersion of funds to the NRG would not produce the effects of significantly
reducing departures from Libya. Thus, the Italian ministry of interior broadened its
strategy to include the local level, including mayors of several Libyan cities. Moreover,
credible reports exist about financial flows to groups in other parts of Libya, including to
tribes that control Libya’s southern border.
The informal agreement concluded between Italy and Libya was not the first of its kind.
Already in 2008 the governments of the two countries, back then Silvio Berlusconi and
Muammar Gaddafi, concluded a Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation that
set forth efforts to prevent irregular migration. On the basis of that treaty, Italy
intercepted migrants on the high sea and returned them to Libya. In the
landmark Hirsi judgment, the European Court of Human Rights held that the interception
and forced return of migrants to Libya violates the prohibition of non-refoulement and
collective expulsion.
So, is the current strategy of containment merely old wine in new bottles? Instead of
channeling funds to one dictator, isn’t Italy merely funding two-dozen warlords now? The
fact is: we do not know (and possibly also the Italian government does not).
The lack of knowledge could be described as a side effect of the way developed states
globally govern (undesired) migration. Informal agreements largely replaced formal
treaties. Cooperation between two governments has been supplanted by networks that
consist of private companies, government officials of different ministries, NGOs, and
paramilitaries. All of these actors pursue their own often conflicting interests. Struggles
over these interests result in constant fluctuations of the actors and their importance.
Particular financial interests might result in violent conflicts between different militia
fractions that are part of the network, as the fighting in Sabrata demonstrates. And
particular actors, such as General Haftar, might use the network to transform his image
from warlord into a serious politician. No specific actor really is in charge: the network is.
Diffusion of responsibilities and clear structures are not merely a side effect, but a legal
strategy
This purposefully built complexity renders it extremely difficult to actually gain
knowledge about the processes and acts of the network. An aura of secrecy prevails, as
anyone passing the security check at the European Border Agency will confirm. This
highlights another point: diffusion of responsibilities and clear structures are not merely
a side effect, but a legal strategy. The Australian government, for instance, introduced
penal sanctions (imprisonment of up to two years) for personnel that leak any
information on the offshore regional processing centers in Nauru.
Spaces of unconstrained violence
German legal theorist Carl Schmitt argued that the colonization of vast new spaces by
European states constrained warfare between European powers. These spaces were
literally beyond the international legal order where violence was unconstrained.
Unconstrained violence used in these spaces provided stability to the European legal
order.
Although we might not have any knowledge about what exactly happens, how
responsibilities are allocated and who exactly is part of the network governing migration,
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the ubiquity of media and civil society reports renders it difficult to deny awareness of
the violence perpetrated against migrants in Libya. Italian journalist Lorenzo Cremonesi
reported about foxholes where migrants were kept over months. Sexual and severe
physical violence are ubiquitous and forced labor widespread. Migrants are regularly
detained indefinitely in overcrowded cells. Even in state run official refugee reception
centers sanitary conditions and hygiene are bleak, as a confidential EU report  issued last
August described.
Violence serves as deterrence. The battered and raped bodies that return to the
countries they fled function as signposts warning other prospective migrants.
It is hard not to see the parallel between the states that contain migrants on Europe’s
behalf and Carl Schmitt’s theory. They – states with factually inexistent legal protection
mechanisms – constitute spaces of unconstrained violence and at the same time
constrain tensions and conflicts within the European legal order that would otherwise
arise on distribution of refugees and allocation of responsibility for examining asylum
claims. Violence serves as deterrence. The battered and raped bodies that return to the
countries they fled function as signposts warning other prospective migrants.
These spaces of unconstrained violence often are literally beyond the pale of law. De
facto inexistent legal protections in Libya render claiming one’s rights illusory. Holding
Italy responsible for violating its obligations under human rights law depends on the
existence of an actual relation between the sovereign and an individual. Italian state
agents must exercise some form of actual control over an individual. As the Memorandum
of Understanding sets forth, Libya exercises control when intercepting migrants and in
the detention centers.
Establishing legal responsibility under the rules on state responsibility seems equally
difficult. It requires knowledge of the facts. Although in principle Italy could be held
responsible for providing aid or assistance to Libyan agents who commit human rights
violations (derived responsibility). Proving such responsibility requires a high evidentiary
threshold: Italy must have provided aid or assistance not merely with knowledge of these
human rights violations, but also with the intent that these violations are committed. This
threshold might in some lone instances be met, but more often than not the strategy of
knowledge diffusion will be successful.
In a sense, Italy has learned its lessons from the European Court of Human
Rights Hirsi judgment: it learned how to avoid the costs of non-compliance with human
rights and the judgment might even have served as a blueprint to do so. In a world of
networks, the latter are always one step ahead of the judiciary.
Europe’s ‘costs’ 
Italy’s current containment policy in Libya is, literally, buying time. It stands for a broader
European containment policy, a policy that does not work. Even the most cynical
argument – deterrence by violence – is an assumption that does not work. Abstract
suffering in the future that individual imagination always hopes to avoid, stands against
concrete experienced suffering in the present. Like human behavior adapts to changing
policies of containment by changing routes, hope is an infinite reservoir of the human
mind. These violent acts are policies with the aim to deter migrants. At the same time,
they are also responses to the attempted border crossing of migrants, of concrete
persons. These responses Europe gives shift its normative fault lines and thus constitute
the normative core of its self-representation – a Europe united in the containment of the
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